The consequences of five recent terrorist attacks on equities listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange are investigated in this paper. In particular, this paper studies how the risks and returns of industrial and market portfolios are altered in both the short term and long term as a result of terrorist events. Both parametric and non-parametric tests are used to explore the relationship between equity stock returns and terrorist attacks and the CAPM is employed to assess whether systematic risks change after these events. The findings are consistent with the bulk of literature whereby September 11 had negative impact on the equity returns coupled with a general increase in the systematic risks. This paper documents negative industry abnormal returns as high as 10.94% on the first day of trading in the Healthcare sector.
I. Introduction
According to a recent study by Lee, Enders and Sandler (2009) , terrorism assumes a transnational character when a terrorist incident in one country involves victims, targets, institutions or citizens of another country. These regrettable events not only results in the loss of lives, property damages and psychological scars in the domestic country but have some consequences on foreign countries. Nikkinen, Omran, Sahltrom and Aijo (2008) argue that the extent to which international markets are influenced by terrorism activities depends on the how well these international markets are integrated with the country directly under terrorist attack. The literature in the area of how international markets are affected by terrorist activities is quite sparse and as such, the primary task of this study is to test if terrorist activities in one country affect a foreign country.
In the economic 1 literature, it has been documented that terrorism tends to have a negative response on, but not limited to, the following factors overall economic activities, per capita GDP, consumption, investment, net exports and growth.
However, in the finance 2 area, research is limited to risks and returns analysis and it is generally accepted that terrorist activities are negatively related to the returns of the stock markets as a result of the negative sentiment that prevails around the time of these events. This first outcome assume that equity holders respond negatively to such events as they perceive an increase in the expected costs of terrorist activities or where the price of basic necessities like foods, alcohol and tobacco generally increases. These empirical results gave credibility to a second outcome that assumes an improvement in the revenue of the business. A third outcome that we cannot ignore is the possibility that terrorism activities do not have any effect on capital markets and there is currently little research to supports this. Under this market condition, it is assumed that market players do not react as they do not perceive that the attack has an impact on expected returns. To test which of the three competing theories hold, this study looks at the consequences of five recent terrorist attacks on the returns of equity markets. The next logical step will be analyze how the terrorist activities affect the risk of capital markets. The extant literature may lead one to believe that terrorist attacks result in either an increase in terrorist risk or no change in the systematic risk [see Nikkinen et al. (2008) , Ito and Lee (2005) , Richman et al. (2005) Chen and Siems (2004) and Drakos (2004) ]. Which of the following outcomes prevails most is not clearly known and given the recent terrorist attacks has not been adequately research; this paper investigates the relationship between systematic risk and terrorist attacks.
The Malaysian Stock Exchange provides an ideal testing ground for the above arguments. Enders and Sandler (2006) argue that Muslim extremists have shifted their attack venues to regions like Asia where they can easily blend into the population and establish a support system. Malaysia has a multicultural population with a strong presence of a Muslim community and has not been directly under terrorist attacks.
The Malaysian market has been overlooked in the terrorism literature as only Chen and Siems (2004) , Richman, Santos, and Barkoulas (2005) studied the how this market in general reacted to September 11. Both studies showed that the Malaysian market reacted negatively to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Chen and Siems (2004) also looked at the Banking sector in this market and documented a fall in the return of this industry. Using a long term regression analysis, Richman, Santos, and Barkoulas (2005) assessed the long term effect on the systematic risk in that market and reported an increase in the level of systematic risk. Our results support these two studies in that we do observe a negative impact on the Malaysian market and an increase in the systematic risk following 9/11.
The contributions of this research are as follows. Firstly, a detailed industry analysis is carried out and this determines precisely which sectors in Malaysia were affected.
Next the effects of the subsequent terrorist attacks are investigated on a both risk and return basis for all the industries and market portfolios. To the best of my knowledge there is no current study that looks at the consequences of the recent terrorist attacks on Malaysian industries. Hence the first objective of this paper is to bridge the gap between the current terrorism literature and Malaysian equity industries. This study will be of interest to market participants who trade in Asia, more specifically Malaysia as it documents how the market react to terrorism activities. In the event of another attack, at a time where there is a war on terror, investors can use the results of this report as a guidance to make their investment decisions. This analysis will be beneficial to portfolio managers that use the top-down investment process as it provides industry effects of terrorism activities. Thirdly the methodologies used in this paper are augmented compared to the earlier research. For instance, firm specific information is excluded in both the industry and market portfolios. Most of the existing literatures fail to exclude firm specific information and thus report results which contain both the impact of terrorist attacks and other non terrorist components. This may lead to some biases in the results of the earlier studies.
The current terrorism literature points towards an increase in systematic risk following a terrorist attack. Using the Bali, Madrid, London and Mumbai evidence, this paper shows that such conclusion does not hold in Malaysia. Furthermore, unlike the majority of the literature, this research analyses the effects of terrorism at micro level.
This study looks at how the major international terrorist attacks had an impact on one single country industrial portfolios whilst other studies show how one terrorist attack affects the rest of the world. The outcomes of this research are consistent with the prior literature, in that September 11 did, indeed, resulted in a decrease in returns and an increase in the systematic risks in the Malaysian market and Malaysian industrial portfolios. However, the Malaysian market and most of the Malaysian industries are insensitive to the remaining terrorist attacks. In Section II, I present the data and methods used in this paper. Section III presents the empirical findings and Section IV provides some concluding remarks.
II. Data and Methods

Data
Daily stock returns indexes, market return calculated from the Kuala Lumpur Table 2 .
Methodology
Event study methodology is used in this empirical analysis to determine the whether the returns of the industries and market portfolios have changed following the terrorist attacks. First the daily return on the Malaysian stocks and the KLCI are calculated as:
where DR it is the daily return for the Malaysian stock i, SRI it is the stock return index for the Malaysian stock i at time t, and SRI it-1 is the previous day stock return index for that same stock i. Following Brown and Warner (1985) , the ex-post abnormal returns (AR it ) for each Malaysian firm is calculated as the difference between observed returns of firm i at event day t, and the expected return, E(R it ). On the day of the terrorist attack, the industry abnormal return calculated by equation 4 will primarily respond to two components namely firm specific information and the actual terrorist event. In an effort to capture only the impact of the terrorist attack and to be free from other firm specific information, all firms with firm specific information 15 days on either side of the event day are excluded from the industry portfolio. Firm specific information is defined as any announcement made on the Malaysian Stock Exchange.
Parametric Tests
The parametric tests used in this study rely on the important assumption that the industry abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are normally distributed. 
Non-Parametric Tests
The literature dealing with abnormal returns show that they are not normally distributed. In particular, the distribution of the abnormal returns tends to exhibit fat tails and positive skewness. Under these circumstances, parametric tests tend to reject the null too often when testing for positive abnormal performance and too seldom when testing for negative abnormal returns. As a robustness test, we turn to an alternative test developed by Corrado (1989) . The existence of large values and positive skewness in the abnormal returns distribution is dealt with in this non-parametric test. The basic principle of this method is to convert the abnormal returns into ranks, and as ranks are generally not very distant from each other, the ranked distribution is less prone to non-normality. This non-parametric test is viewed as a more powerful at detecting the false null hypothesis of no abnormal returns. As such, the non-parametric t-statistic, t np , for the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns for each industry is therefore given by:
is the standard deviation of the average rank and is denoted by:
Regression Analysis
It is assumed that the efficient market hypothesis holds as Malaysian investors assess all the economic, political and terrorist risks before making their financial decisions.
When a terrorist attack occurs, it may affect the systematic risk by the amount of the terrorist risk. So next I test if the terrorist events had an impact on the systematic risk of the industrial and market portfolios. To that end, a standard CAPM is estimated and the Chow breakpoint test is applied to see if the model has changed after the terrorist attacks. This simple procedure will only inform us whether there are some changes in the model but cannot specify whether the effect is short or long term. As a result the CAPM was modified to capture the changes (if any) in systematic risk in these two different states. 
The test determines whether the level of risk, particularly captured by structural changes, is altered after the event day. SD is a structural dummy variable that takes the value of 0 prior to the event, and 1 after the day of the event. This variable captures the structural changes and influence of terrorist attacks on the systematic risk over a long term horizon.
Returns for each industry are gathered 244 days prior to the event, and 15 days after the event. Standard tests and residual diagnostics revealed no major concerns with the above two econometric models. I also test if these dummy variables were redundant in the above equations using a Wald test for restrictions.
III. Empirical Findings
This section outlines the empirical findings of five different international terrorist attacks that happened in the US, Spain, Indonesia, UK, and India on the Malaysian Stock Exchange. Using parametric tests, non-parametric test and regression analysis I test whether the risk and return of 19 Malaysian industries and the Malaysian market were affected by these five events. The attacks in the US had a strong negative impact on returns for all the portfolios investigated and a general increase in systematic risk of most of the portfolios in both the short term and long term.
Interestingly, we do not find similar evidence for the subsequent attacks. Surprisingly, the attack on a neighbouring country, Indonesia, had a positive impact in one of the Malaysian sector.
United States-September 11
The US market opened 6 days after the September 11 whilst the Malaysian market had to cease trading on the 12 th of September 2001. It is thus important to note that I am assessing the performance of the Malaysian portfolios on the 13 th of September 2001 and this is consistent to the approach used by Richman et al. (2005) . This implies that the market participants had at least one day to think about their strategy in the Malaysian equity markets. Further it is important to remember that firms with firm specific information surrounding the event were excluded in this analysis and this may account for the results presented in this study. Table 3 and Table 4 Table 3 and Table 4 show a clear and consistent negative effect on equities listed in the Malaysian Stock Exchange following the September 11 attack. Figure 1 depicts both the abnormal and cumulative abnormal return of the equity portfolios and illustrates both a negative abnormal return and a negative five day cumulative abnormal return (except for Capital Goods).
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 report the abnormal returns and the parametric t-statistics for the various sectors and market portfolio. Table 3 shows that the returns in the Capital Goods sector fell by 9.12% after the September 11 attack, and the t-statistic
shows that this value is statistically different from zero. Interestingly, all the other equity portfolios exhibited a negative and significant abnormal return. In other words the nineteen industrial portfolios and the market portfolio were severely affected by the event. The sector that was affected the most was the Healthcare sector, which fell by 10.94%. This is not a large proportion given that Cam (2006) , reports a 35% fall in the returns of Airline and Airport industry and after the September 11 attacks in the US. Carter and Simkins (2004) and Drakos (2004) demonstrate a 10% to 16% decline in the Japanese Airline businesses immediately after the attack. Although the GICS industry classification differs from the one country to another, the Travel sector was only down by 7.86% on the first day of trading in Malaysia. To the best of my knowledge there is only one paper that looks at the industry analysis of September 11
on Malaysian market and it is also limited to the Banking sector and the market portfolio. Chen and Siems (2004) documents that the Banking sector was down by 5.2%, immediately after the attack and the result presented in this paper shows that the Bank sector declined by 6.06%. Chen and Siems (2004) and Richman et al. (2005) shows that the overall Malaysian market was down by 4.46% and 3.9% whilst this study argues a more significant drop of 7.50%. These discrepancies may lie in the portfolio construction methodology whereby firm specific information was excluded in this experiment. The abnormal return findings presented in Table 2 The event day ARs show the immediate investor reaction to terrorist attacks whilst the five day cumulative abnormal returns provide a stronger indication of the capital market's stickiness or capability to rebound from the terrorist attacks. The CAR approach reinforces the above findings in terms of this methodology supports the hypothesis of negative sentiment after the September 11 attack. Of the 20 equity portfolios that were studied, 19 portfolios exhibit a negative cumulative abnormal return over the following five days. The second column of Table 4 shows that the Capital Goods sector rebounded and that the remaining sectors deteriorated with Pharmaceutical sector being the worst performing sector with -21.65% as CAR over the next five days. This is also depicted in Figure 1 and it is also noticeable from that same figure that the CAR is generally higher than the event day AR for all the industries that were negatively affected. This implies that the market continued to plummet over the following five days and amazingly the returns fell by more than twice of the amount of the AR. These findings are consistent with Chen and Siems (2004) who showed that cumulative abnormal return is around -13.36% and 15.41% six days after the event for the Banking sector and market portfolio respectively. Such result is, however, inconsistent with Cam (2006) who found that the CAR over the following six days is lower than the abnormal return for US firms.
To address the issue of non-normality in the distribution of AR, a robustness test in terms of a non-parametric ranking test was used. Generally speaking the results of the non-parametric tests supports the results observed in the parametric analysis.
Considering the non-parametric 4 results in Table 5 , it appears that this test support the view of a negative sentiment surrounding the September 11 attacks in the Malaysian equity markets as all the non-parametric t-tests were negative. However, just over 50% of the portfolios are statistically significant. The negative impact of the 9/11 event on Malaysian market portfolio and ten other industry portfolios were not questionable by the non-parametric tests. For instance, column 2 of Table 5 shows that the non-parametric t-statistic is -2.28 for the Bank industry. This reflects the negative abnormal returns identified earlier in the parametric tests.
Following the above discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that the returns of the Malaysian industries and the market portfolio were strongly negatively affected following the September 11 attack. Based on the risk and return theories, it is fair to assume that such drop in return will be matched by an increase in the systematic risk of these equity portfolios. Table 6 show that systematic risk statistically increased in fifteen sectors out of the nineteen sectors. For example the beta of the Bank sector was 0.87 (see column 3 of Table 6 column 10,
show that around ninety percent of the industries exhibit an increase in systematic risk in the long run. For example, the systematic of the Banking industry increased by 0.55 after the September attacks. Once again these results are consistent with the majority of the literature in the field on this point.
As a general conclusion, it is possible to claim that the aftermath of 9/11 is far more beyond what is reported in Table 2 and the existing literature. The evidence provided in this section shows the financial consequences of this event at a micro level in a country other than the US. Almost every industry in Malaysia was affected by terrorist events that happened outside their own territories. The next question will be whether other terrorist attacks had similar consequences in these Malaysian industries.
Bali
Bali bombing is geographically the closest to the Malaysian soil and this event occurred on Saturday 12 th October 2002. The first day that the Malaysian market traded after the attack, was on the Monday 14 th October 2002. Theoretically and based on the above empirical evidence, one will expect a decrease in the return of Malaysian equity markets coupled with a decrease in the systematic risk following this attack. Intuitively, this geographical closeness will lead one to believe that the effects will be more pronounced. Contrary to the prior beliefs, the empirical evidence documented in this paper shows otherwise. The results of the parametric test on sector returns for this day are shown in Table 3 (Columns 4 and 5). At face value, all the portfolios show a negative response to the attack. However, only the Utilities sector was statistically significantly affected. The robustness test also support the claim of a negative effect in the Utilities sector on the first day of trading. The third column of Table 5 shows the results on the non-parametric test on the various Malaysian industries. Similar to the event day AR results, the non-parametric tstatistic is negative for all the industries but significant for only the Utilities industry.
Over the following 5 day trading period, most portfolios changed from negative abnormal returns to positive abnormal returns. However, only the Media industry recorded a statistically significant cumulative abnormal cumulative return (see Table   4 ) for Bali bombing. Against all the priori beliefs about the impact of terrorist attacks that occurred in Indonesia on the Malaysian returns, the general conclusion that can be drawn is that immediately after the event, only one sector, Media industry, was positively affected while all other sectors were insensitive to the event. Similar to the return analysis, the short run regression analysis 6 shows no significant results except So far, the empirical evidence is mixed in terms of the effects of terrorist on risk and return. On the one hand, the September 11 attacks had a major negative influenced on the Malaysian industries whilst the Malaysian sectors were insensitive to the Indonesian terrorist attacks. It is thus important to study other terrorist attacks before a consensus can be drawn on the effects of terrorist attacks on the risk and return of Malaysian equity markets. To that end, the Madrid terrorist attack is being investigated.
Madrid
So far, geographical differences have not shown any clear indication as to how terrorist activities will affect the Malaysian economy. On the one hand, the empirical evidence shows that a distant nation like the US had an impact on this country's stock market whilst a geographically closer attack in Indonesia had no major influence.
Therefore it is worth studying how terrorist events that occurred in Europe influence an Asian country. To the best of my knowledge, there is no current study that looks at the consequences of Madrid terrorist attacks on the Malaysian financial markets. This result can be regarded as another contribution to the literature as at present there is no study that looks at the impact of Madrid bombings on the Malaysian market. The bombings in Madrid occurred on Thursday 11 th March 2004 and with the time zone difference, the Malaysian market opened on the following day. The techniques described in the methodology section were applied to test if the risks and returns of Malaysian industries and market were responsive to the terrorist attacks that occurred in Spain. The results of the parametric test immediately after the attacks and five day after the attacks are shown in columns 6 and 7 of Table 3 and Table 4 respectively.
Based on these two parametric tests, only the Telecommunication industry was significantly positively affected five days after the attack. However this was not followed by a change in the systematic risk of that sector and in addition none of the sectors recorded a change in their systematic risks. As a general conclusion, it is possible to state that terrorist events that incurred in Spain did not have a major influence on the Malaysian market. These results reinforce the findings of the Bali bombings whereby terrorist events do not affect the risk and return of Malaysian equity markets.
London
Other than the September 11 attacks, the two subsequent attacks did not play a major role in the risks and returns of Malaysian equities. This unfortunate incident will allow us to further understand how the Malaysian equity markets respond to terrorist attacks.
On Thursday 7 th July 2005, London was subject to terrorist attacks and given that
Malaysia was an ex-colony of the British Empire, one would think that this incident will move the Malaysian market. Surprisingly enough, the market's response to the attack was muted. Both the parametric and the non-parametric tests show that none of the portfolios studied were altered on the first day of trading and five days after the attack the Consumer Durable and Apparels sector was positively influenced. Furthermore the CAPM also reported no changes in the systematic risk. The lessons learnt from this incident are similar to the lessons learnt from the Bali and Madrid bombings as most of the industries were immunized from the London bombings.
Mumbai
It is now clearer that the Malaysian market is not sensitive to the terrorist attacks (except for the September 11 attack). With this priori hypothesis in mind, I will postulate that Mumbai's attacks will not move the Malaysian market. The majority of the portfolios support the priori hypothesis of no effect on the risks and returns of Malaysian firms. The Indian, British, Spanish, and Indonesian evidence shows that it is wrong to assume that terrorist attacks will impact negatively on stock markets and fails to support the transnational characteristic of Lee, Enders and Sandler (2009) . As such investment havens do exist even under terrorist attacks.
IV. Conclusion
So far, the extent of the literature in this field postulates a negative relationship between terrorism and the stock market. However the recent terrorist attacks diverts from this view. Using the five recent terrorist attacks, this study shows that equity markets, in particular, the Malaysian equity market was insensitive to most of the events despite the negative sentiment that prevails after the incidents. The risks and returns of the industrial portfolios and market portfolios did not change after Bali, Madrid, London and Mumbai's terrorist attacks. One must be careful in generalizing and extending the hypothesis that the stock markets are not responsive to terrorist activities in other stock markets. I believe that the same research needs to be conducted in other countries to test which of these two competing theory holds. This paper finds theoretical consistency with the earlier theory whereby the September 11 events had a negative impact on the Malaysian equity market. Surprisingly all of the industries were down on the day of that event, and most of remained negatively affected 5 days after the event. Approximately eighty percent of the industries studied showed an increase in systematic risk following the 9/11 attacks in both the short term and long term. Based on the above findings, one can conclude that except for terrorist attacks that occur in the United States, investors can consider Malaysia as an investment paradise after a terrorist attack. 
